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INTRODUCTION

Obscenity remains an anomaly in our system of freedom of expression in that
it receives no First Amendment protection, despite the expansion of such protection
for many other types of speech. Content-based restriction of speech is generally
considered repugnant in our constitutional scheme, yet the government continues
to restrict obscene communication.

* Director of Research Development, University of Rhode Island Research Office. Ph.D., mass
communication, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, 1993.
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Some observers employing a traditional legal analysis may not be alarmed by
the government's power to restrict obscenity. The legal definition of obscenity is
content with no "literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."' From this
perspective, government control of obscene content is little cause for concern. But
viewing the problem through a wide-angle lens, so to speak, tells a different story.
That lens is political economy.
Mass communication scholar Denis McQuail defined political economy as a
view of media and society in which economic factors "play a determining role and
in which politics is primarily about economic power."2 A political economy of
communication examines the relationship between the media "and the broader
social structure of society," specifically with respect to the interplay of economics
and politics. 3 Political economy of communication also examines how ownership
and government policies affect media behavior and content, and how media support
or challenge prevailing class relations.4
American media are overwhelmingly commercial entities, and the government
is empowered to regulate commerce, among other public activities. The vast
majority of obscenity cases that have reached the United States Supreme Court have
involved a mass medium. The law has continued to control obscenity by framing
it not as an idea that is being silenced, but as a commodity whose distribution the
government can legitimately regulate. This approach to the control of obscenity has
allowed government to wield great power over the individuals and businesses that
trade in obscenity. Commodification of obscenity fits into a broader legal trend
toward propertization of speech, which commentators have warned is dangerous for
freedom of expression precisely because of the wide latitude government has to
control property.5
This Article analyzes United States Supreme Court decisions from the
perspective of political economy to examine the legal means the government has
used to control obscene content. Methods of control have varied by medium. Print
media, which receive full First Amendment protection, have been controlled
through restrictions on the distribution of their end product. First, government has
brought criminal charges against those operating a point of sale for obscene
material. Second, it has attempted to curb the dissemination of obscene material by
exercising its legitimate control of the mail and interstate commerce. Third, state
and local governments have used their control of land use zoning and other
regulatory powers to restrict brick-and-mortar vendors of obscene material. Similar
approaches have been taken for othertangible products and brick-and-mortar points
of sale, such as videotapes and movie theaters. Broadcasters and common carriers

1. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15. 24 (1973).
2. DENIS MCQUAIL, MCQUAIL'S MASS COMMUNICATION THEORY 501(4th ed. 2000).
3. Robert McChesney, Afaking a Molehill Out ofa Mountain: The Sad State ofPoliticalEconomy
in U.S. Media Studies, in TOWARD A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CULTURE 41, 43 (Andrew Calabrese &
Colin Sparks eds.. 2004).
4. Id.
5. See Matthew D. Bunker, Trespassing Speakers and Commodified Speech: FirstAmendment
Freedoms Meet PrivateProperty Claims, 77 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 713 (2000).
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fall under the regulatory purview of the Federal Communications Commission,
which exerts powerful control through licensure. On the Internet, the government
has attempted to control the flow of obscenity through commercial speech
regulation and its spending power.
Part 11 of this Article briefly reviews First Amendment theory, examining why
freedom of expression is valued in the United States and is important for the mass
media. Part III discusses the rationale behind the government's control of obscenity.
Part IV examines political economy and communication, discussing the forces
outside of the First Amendment that affect freedom of expression in the media. This
discussion leads to the notion of the "propertization" of speech, a trend toward
using property law rather than the First Amendment to control expression. Using
this broader shift toward propertization as a point of departure, Part V analyzes the
Supreme Court's opinions in obscenity cases, grouping them according to the type
of law restricting the material. Part VI discusses the Supreme Court decisions
allowing social class structuration to play a role in the obscenity cases. The Article
concludes in Part VII that the government's view of obscenity as a commercial
product sets dangerous precedent for freedom of expression.
II.

FREE EXPRESSION VALUES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment has long been
considered essential to the functioning of a democratic society. Thomas Emerson
identified four values underlying freedom of expression doctrine that are familiar
to every student of the First Amendment: individual self-fulfillment, attainment of
truth, self-governance, and a "safety-valve" function.6 These values are worth
reviewing in some detail because they provide the rationales for limiting
government control of speech.
Individual self-fulfillment is an important value underlying the American
system of freedom of expression. The principle arises from Western society's view
of according the individual the right of self-realization; suppression of beliefs and
expression is an "affront to the dignity of man."7 Emerson argued powerfully for
the centrality of this value:
[T]hought and communication are the fountainhead of all
expression of the individual personality.... Freedom at this point
is essential to all other freedoms.... [T]he power of society and
the state over the individual is so pervasive, and construction of
doctrines, institutions and administrative practices to limit this
power so difficult, that only by drawing such a protective line
between expression and action is it possible to strike a safe

6. Thomas 1. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the FirstAmendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
878 79 (1963).
7. Id. at 879.
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balance between authority and freedom.8
In this view, freedom of expression helps to protect the individual from societal
power. The attainment of truth, the second value Emerson identified, involves the
advancement of knowledge. 9 It accrues to both the individual and society." The
free flow of knowledge enhances the ability of individuals to discover truth, while
also enhancing collective decisionmaking. This value promotes "a rethinking and
retesting of the accepted opinion."" The third value, participation in
decisionmaking, is an "open discussion" to which all citizens of the democratic
society are invited. 2 Although this value is clearly related to the political process,
it applies to other fields of endeavor as well. According to Emerson, this theory
"embraced the right to participate in the building of the whole culture, and included
freedom of expression in ' religion,
literature, art, science and all areas of human
3
learning and knowledge."'
The fourth and final of Emerson's values underpinning freedom of expression
is that it serves a safety-valve function by helping to maintain a balance between
stability and change.' 4 The airing of ideas allows for "political legitimization" 5 :
those who have the freedom to express their ideas are more likely to support a
decision they previously opposed if they believe in the legitimacy of the process
through which the decision was made. Although such freedom for disagreement and
discord is potentially risky, Emerson stressed that the state retains the power to
regulate action should any danger arise.' 6
Emerson approached freedom of expression as a right to speak that inheres
within and benefits the individual. He also framed it as an information-exchange
process essential to a democratic society because it facilitates the search for truth
and collective decisionmaking. In so doing, freedom of expression is valuable to
society because it provides a crucial means to maintaining balance between social
order and change.
The obscenity cases have used a different frame of reference, which has
allowed the government more leeway in controlling such content. First, the right to
express oneself discussed by Emerson has been distinguished from the right to
receive information. The latter is a corollary of the First Amendment, and there is
"*no consensus view on the scope of the right to receive information or the standard
of review that will apply to the right."' As this Article will show, the Supreme
Court has typically viewed obscenity cases from the perspective of the person

8. Id. at 881.
9. Id.
10. Id.
II. Id. at 882.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 883.
14. Id. at 884.
15. Id. at 885.
16. Id. at 886.
17. Susan Nevelow Mart, The Right to Receive Information. 95 LAW LIB. J. 175, 187 (2003).
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distributing or receiving the message, rather than the person creating it. By taking
this perspective, the Court has further curtailed the protection available for obscene
content. Second, the Court has framed many obscenity cases in terms of
commercial speech, although it seldomly explicitly acknowledged this. Commercial
speech has traditionally received less protection than speech about matters of public
concern. 8 Also, in these cases the freedom to circulate publications was seen not
as a personal civil liberty with the requisite First Amendment protection, but as a
commercial transaction.
111.

RATIONALE FOR CONTROL OF OBSCENITY

Regulation of speech based on content has been anathema to the American
system of freedom of expression for years, 9 yet the exclusion of obscenity from
First Amendment protection continues.20 This can be attributed to historical and
political factors. A brief overview of the history of obscenity in the United States
follows to provide context for the subsequent analysis.
Government has sought to control obscenity because of the presumed harmful
effects of such content. Roots of this assumption can be traced to mid-seventeenth
century English law. A test for obscenity emerged from The Queen v. Hicklin,2 1 a
case dealing with an anti-Catholic pamphlet: "whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall."22
This test, which emphasized the effect of the message on susceptible individuals
rather than the general public, "had a significant effect on the development of
American obscenity law. '2 3 In colonial America, the regulation of obscenity
unfolded in a similar fashion.24 All colonies had statutes that criminalized
blasphemy or heresy.25 Laws against obscenity began to appear in the early
eighteenth century but focused primarily on religious speech.26 In 1815, the first
conviction for the common law crime of obscene libel was reported.27 While other
types of content restriction fell away as democracy developed, control over

18. See, e.g.. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63
(1980) (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456, 457 (1978)) (stating that the United
States Constitution provides "lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally
guaranteed expression").
19. See, e.g.. Police Dep't v. Mosely. 408 U.S. 92, 94. 95-96 (1972) (holding a city ordinance
unconstitutional because it made an exception for peaceful picketing).
20. See, e.g., Ashcroftv. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564,566 67,574 (2002) (quoting Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15. 24 (1973)) (analyzing the applicability of the Miller test to determine whether material on
the Internet was obscene, thus receiving no First Amendment protection).
21. (1868) 3 L.R.Q.B. 360.
22. Id. at 371.
23. FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 8 (1976).

24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Sharpless. 2 Serg. & Rawle 91. 104-105 (Pa. 1815)).
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obscenity remained.28
Obscenity has provided a convenient soapbox issue for government officials.
Anthony Comstock was a well-known crusader against obscenity who pushed in
the late nineteenth century for postal restrictions on obscenity.29 The result was
what is known as the Comstock Act, legislation that prohibited the mailing of
obscene publications. 31Police efforts to control obscenity have often been proactive
sting operations rather than responses to citizen complaints. 3 1More recently, former
United States Attorney General John Ashcroft waged a battle against Internet child
pornography.32
IV. POLITICAL ECONOMY AND COMMUNICATION

Vincent Mosco defined political economy as "the study of the social relations,
particularly the power relations, that mutually constitute the production,
distribution, and consumption of resources., 33 When applied to communication, this
approach examines the relationship between media and communication systems
vis-a-vis their relationship to the broader structure of society.34 Political economy
also explores how media ownership and government policies contribute to the
development of media systems and communication technologies, and how these
factors affect media behavior and content.35 The political economy perspective
recognizes that communication media are "embedded in larger macro-structures of
power,, 36 and that forces such as hypercommercialism, rather than commitment to
First Amendment values, are shaping their content. 7 Political economy also takes
note of the transformation of a message into a marketable product the
commodification of media content.38

28. See id.
at 10.
29. See Michael Grossberg. Does CensorshipReally ProtectChildren?,54 FED. COMM. L.J. 591,
592-93 (2002) (book review).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (2000 & Supp. 2003).
31. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
32. See Torsten Ove, Child Porn Sweep Nets 100; National Probe of Web Site Finds 500
SubscribersHere, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 9, 2001, at Al: Wayne Washington, Web Child
Porn Raids by FBI Yield Arrests, Ashcroft Announces, BOSTON GLOBE, March 19, 2002, at A2.
33. VINCENT Mosco, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMMUNICATION 25 (1996) (emphasis
omitted).
34. See id.
35. McChesney, supra note 3, at 43.
36. David Skinner et al., Mappingthe Threads, in CONVERGING MEDIA, DIVERGING POLITICS: A
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NEWS MEDIA IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 7, 10 (David Skinner et
al. eds. 2005).
37. Mark Cooper, Hyper-Commercialism and the Media: The Threat of Journalism and
Democratic Discourse, in COVERING MEDIA, DIVERGING POLITICS, supra note 36, at 117.
38. MOSCO, supra note 33, at 146.
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Commodificationand Propertization

The concept of commodification originated in Marxist theory.39 Marx drew a
distinction between "use-value" and "exchange-value. 40 Use value is an object's
capacity "to satisfy a human want or need."41 Exchange value is the price that can
be commanded in return for the object.4 2 The transformation of use values to
exchange values is commodification.43 In applying these concepts to
communication, political economists have studied the "significance of those
structural forms responsible for the production, distribution and exchange of
communication commodities and for the regulation of these structures, principally
by the state., 44 Political economists also have examined commodification in
communication by focusing on media content. "[F]rom this point of view, the
process of commodification in communication involves transforming messages,
ranging from
bits of data to systems of meaningful thought, into marketable
45
products.,
The use value of a media message can be construed as the self-fulfillment its
author derives from its creation, or as the satisfaction of an audience member's need
or desire for the information. Commodification transforms obscene messages into
products with exchange value. In other words, a thought about obscenity is
transformed into a message in a tangible medium of expression. The message is
typically disseminated by mass media, which in the United States are commercial
entities. These message-products are distributed to retail establishments and sold
to audience members. It is this chain of production over which government is able
to exert control.
Outside the realm of political economy, a growing body of legal literature has
taken note of the apparent commodification of speech. This commodification has
been viewed as part of a larger trend toward the preeminence of property rights.
Lawrence Lessig commented more than fifteen years ago on society's growing and
persistent belief in the alchemical power of property rights as a cure-all for
contemporary societal problems.46 This is cause for concern in the realm of First
Amendment law, because the government is able to exert more control over
property than over speech. Diane Zimmerman explained:
[D]espite large areas of peaceful coexistence between the values
protected by the Speech and Press Clauses and those defended by

39. See id. at 140.
40. W.A. SUCHITING, MARX: AN INTRODUCTION 78 (1983).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. MOSCO, supra note 33, at 141.
44. Id. at 145.
45. Id. at 146.
46. Lawrence Lessig, Professor, Harvard Law School, Keynote Address at the Fordham
Intellectual Property Media & Entertainment Law Journal Symposium: Commons and Code (Feb. 9,
1999). in 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 405, 405 (1999).
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property doctrines, conflict between the two is serious. What
seems to have happened in the course of this conflict is that an
ever-expanding array of new or reconstructed property theories is
cannibalizing speech values at the margin. In large part, this has
occurred not because speech claims are inherently weaker than
property claims, but because courts fail to think critically about
the justifications for, functions of, and limitations on property
rules in the sensitive area of speech.47
In fact, some have argued that speech receives greater legal protection than
property rights:
Under U.S. constitutional law freedom of speech and press
get greater protection than do economic freedoms. If the
government regulates ordinary market processes, such as
contracting or use of property, the regulations will be sustained as
long as there is some rational basis for the legislation, and the
regulations implement the rational basis to some minimal
degree.48
In contrast, "when the regulations seem to violate the guarantees of freedom of
speech or press the Court engages in far more searching review ....
[C]ontentbased regulations must pass the very demanding 'compelling state interest test' to
survive."49
Thus, commodification of speech can result in grave consequences for First
Amendment freedoms. When courts view obscene messages as commodities, they
open the gates to the use of the lower standard of review used for economic
freedoms. That is precisely what the Supreme Court has done. The duration and
breadth of this control have been remarkable, but it has met only lukewarm
opposition, probably because of the low social value ascribed to obscene content.
Regardless of the value ascribed to obscenity, its control is cause for concern as
property theories come to dominate the legal arena. Obscenity can be viewed as the
archetype of what might happen to First Amendment freedoms when media
messages are treated as property rather than the expression of ideas.

47. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts
on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 667 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
48. Matthew L. Spitzer, Turner, Denver, and Reno, in A COMMUNICATIONS CORNUCOPIA 172,
198 (Roger G. Noll & Monroe E. Price eds.. 1998).
49. Id. at 199; see also Bunker, supra note 5, at 713 ("[P]roperty rights hardly have the same
cachet as First Amendment freedoms."); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 42
UCLA L. REV. 949, 950 (1995) ("[E]ven content-neutral laws face stricter tests of rationality than do
general regulations of the economic market.")
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B. Structuration
Structuration, "the process of constituting structures with social agency,"5 like
commodification, is critical to political economy. Its outcome "is a set of social
relational and power processes organized around class, gender, race, and social
movements that both correspond to and oppose one another.""DI Social class has
played a role in the Court's obscenity jurisprudence, beginning with the legal
definition of obscenity itself.5 2 Repeated use of the definition has reinforced the
notion that elite or high culture is generally not considered obscene.
V.

LEGAL APPROACHES TO THE CONTROL OF OBSCENITY

Political economy recognizes the centrality of power in the analysis of
communication. 3 The law codifies government's power. With regard to
communication, the government's power is limited by the First Amendment. This
protection may prevail when the communicator is an individual and is expressing
ideas that conform to the hegemony. But when the communicator stands to gain
financially from expressing an idea, and the idea is not accepted by the hegemony,
First Amendment protection is compromised. Most obscenity cases reaching the
Supreme Court do not require the justices to wrestle with whether the content at
issue in a particular dispute was legally obscene, scouring it for any redeeming
social value. Rather, other legal issues are in the forefront of obscenity cases. The
government has used legitimate powers that are not limited by the First Amendment
to control the dissemination of obscene content. The next subparts review these
legal means of control and are organized by the level of government enforcing the
law: state, local, and federal.
A.

State Controls

State governments use a variety of powers in their efforts to control obscenity.
Criminal law is most common, followed by several other means which are
discussed in detail below.
1.

CriminalStatutes

Criminal law is a very powerful method of government control. According to
John C. Klotter, "A crime is a public wrong in that it affects public rights and is an
injury to the whole community. '"" Criminal law emphasizes the prevention of

50. Mosco, supra note 33, at 138.
51. Id. at 139.
52. See infra Part VI.
53. Mosco. supra note 33, at 257.
54. JOHN C. KLOTTER, CRIMINAL LAW 17 (Elizabeth Roszmann Ebben ed., 6th ed. 2001) (citing
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657. 668-69 (1892)).
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undesirable conduct by imposing punishment for it. 55 In criminal law, the action is
initiated by the state, rather than an individual, 56 and the punishment can be a fine
or imprisonment.5 In the cases identified for this Article, criminal law was the most
common method used by the government to control obscenity. 58 The states 59 and
the federal government 6° have statutes that criminalize the sale, distribution, and
exhibition of obscene material. Generally, in the Supreme Court obscenity cases
involving criminal law, the conduct at issue was the sale of obscene material. The
obscene material was treated as a commodity in a commercial transaction, rather
than as the expression of an idea.
About one-third of the obscenity cases identified for this Article involved state
criminal law. 61 In these cases, police targeted brick-and-mortar points of sale for

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
ANN. §§

Id. at 5.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 16-17.
See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
ALA. CODE §§ 13A-12-130 to -200.12 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2006): ARIZ. REV. STAT.
13-3501 to -3513 (2001 & Supp. 2006): ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-68-201 to -503 (2005); CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 311 312.7 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-7-101 to -106 (2006);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-193 to -210 (West 2001 & Supp. 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. I I
§§ 1361-1366 (2001 & Supp. 2006): FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 847.001-.202 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-12-80 to -105 (2003 & Supp. 2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 712-1210 to
-1219.5 (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-4101 to -4116 (2004 & Supp.
2006); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-20 to -20.1 (West 2002 & Supp. 2006); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 3549-1-1 to -3-4 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2006): 1OWA CODE ANN. §§ 728.1-.15 (West 2003 & Supp.
2007): KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4301 to -4301c (1995 & Supp. 2005); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 531.010 .370 (LexisNexis 1999 & Supp. 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:106 106.3 (2004 &
Supp 2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2911 2913 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 1-101
to -211 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2006): MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §§ 28-32 (West 2000 &
Supp. 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2938 (West 2000): MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 617.241-.299
(West 2003 & Supp. 2007); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-29-101 to -109 (2006); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 573.010-.100 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007): MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-31-4101 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-808 to -829 (1995): NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 201.235-.254 (LexisNexis 2006): N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 650:1-6 (LexisNexis 1996 & Supp. 2006): N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:34-2 to -7 (West 2005);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-37-1 to -38-2 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2006); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 235.00 .24 (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-190.1 to -190.15 (2005); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-27.1-01 to .1-12 (1997 & Supp. 2005): OHIO REV. CODEANN. §§ 2907.31-.37
(LexisNexis 2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 1021-1040.80 (2002 & Supp. 2007): ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 167.060 .100 (2005); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 11-31-1 to -13 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § § 16-15-305 to -445 (2003 & Supp. 2006); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 22-24-25 to -37 (LexisNexis 1998 & Supp. 2003): TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-901 to -920
(2006); TEX. PENAL CODEANN. § 43.21-.27 (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2006): UTAH CODEANN. §§ 76-101201 to - 1233 (2003 & Supp. 2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 2801 2813 (1998 & Supp. 2006); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-372 to -387.1 (2004 & Supp. 2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.68.015-.140
(West 2003 & Supp. 2007): WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 944.20-25 (West 2005 & Supp. 2006): WYO. STAT.
ANN. §§ 6-4-301 to -304 (2005 & Supp. 2006). Alaska does not have general obscenity statutes;
however, the state has the power to limit juveniles access to obscene material. Hanby v. State, 479 P.2d
486, 497-98 (Alaska 1970).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1460-1470 (2000 & Supp. 2004).
61. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 563-64 (1991); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103,
106-07 (1990); Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 578 79 (1989); Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v.
Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 53 (1989): Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n.. 484 U.S. 383, 386-87 (1988):
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obscenity rather than the creators of the obscenity. Most of these cases arose from
incidents at bookstores or newsstands,62 video stores,63 and theaters64-physical
locations that police could easily visit. Indeed, many of the cases originated as
police sting operations," some of which resulted in seizure of the allegedly obscene
material.66 Occasionally, a vendor was accused of selling obscenity to a minor.6 7 In
other cases, the distributor 8 or publisher" 9 of the allegedly obscene material was

Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 499 (1987); New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 869 (1986);
Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 465 (1985); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 752 (1982); Wood
v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261,263 (1981); Lo-Ji Sales. Inc. v. New York. 442 U.S. 319.324 (1979) Ballew
v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223,225 (1978); Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 770 (1977); Splawn v. California,
431 U.S. 595,596 (1977); McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669,672 73 (1976); Bucolo v. Adkins, 424
U.S. 641. 641 (1976); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332. 335 (1975) Jenkins v. Georgia. 418 U.S. 153,
155 (1974): Roaden v. Kentucky. 413 U.S. 496. 497 (1973); Heller v. New York. 413 U.S. 483. 485
(1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 116 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,
51 n. I (1973); Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 229 (1972); Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313, 314
(1972): Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971) Byrne v. Karalexis. 401 U.S. 216. 217 (1971);
Dyson v. Stein. 401 U.S. 200. 201 (1971); Stanley v. Georgia. 394 U.S. 557. 558 (1969); Lee Art
Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636, 636 (1968); Rabeck v. New York, 391 U.S. 462, 462 (1968);
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 631 (1968); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 768 (1967);
Mishldn v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 503 (1966); A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a
Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 415 (1966): A Quantity of
Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 206 07 (1964); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 185 86
(1964); Marcus v. Search Warrant of Prop. at 104 E. Tenth St., 367 U.S. 717, 718 19 (1961); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643. 643 (1961): Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 508 (1948): see also Motion for
Leave to File Brief and Brief for Citizens for Decency Through Law. Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Splawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595 (No. 76-143), 1977 WL 205324, *5 6 (indicating the
obscene material was sold from a bookstore); Appellant's Brief in Response to Petition, Rabeck v. New
York, 391 U.S. 462 (No. 611). 1967 WL 129503, *4 (indicating the obscene material was sold from a
candy store).
62. Fort Wayne Books, Inc., 489 U.S. at 50; Am. Booksellers Ass 'n, 484 U.S. at 388 n.3; Pope,
481 U.S. at 499; Macon, 472 U.S. at 465; Ferber,458 U.S. at 751 52; Lo Ji Sales, Inc., 442 U.S. at
321; McKinney. 424 U.S. at 672; Kaplan, 413 U.S. at 116; Ginsberg,390 U.S. at 631; Redrup, 386 U.S.
at 768: Winters. 333 U.S. at 508.
63. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. at 869.
64. Ballew, 435 U.S. at 224; Hicks, 422 U.S. at 334 35; Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 154; Roaden, 413
U.S. at 497: Heller, 413 U.S. at 485: Slaton, 413 U.S. at 50; Rabe, 405 U.S. at 313: Byrne, 401 U.S. at
217; Lee Art Theatre,Inc., 392 U.S. at 636; Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 185.
65. Pope, 481 U.S. at 499; P.J.Video, Inc., 475 U.S. at 870; Macon, 472 U.S. at 465; Ferber,458
U.S. at 751 52; Ballew, 435 U.S. at 224 25; Ward, 431 U.S. at 770; McKinney, 424 U.S. at 672;
Roaden, 413 U.S. at 497; Heller. 413 U.S. at 485: Kaplan, 413 U.S. at 116; Slaton, 413 U.S. at 52:
Rabe, 405 U.S. at 314 (1972); LeeArt Theatre, Inc., 392 U.S. at 636: Redrup. 386 U.S. at 768: Butler,
352 U.S. at 381.
66. P.J Video, Inc., 475 U.S. at 870; Ballew, 435 U.S. at 224 25; Roaden, 413 U.S. at 497 98;
Heller, 413 U.S. at 485: Lee Art Theatre,Inc., 392 U.S. at 636.
67. Rabeck, 391 U.S. at 462; Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631.
68. A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 208 (1964); Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 61 (1963); Marcus v. Search Warrant of Prop. at 104 E. Tenth St., 367 U.S. 717,
721 (1961).
69. Bucolo v. Adkins, 424 U.S. 641. 641 (1976); Kois v. Wisconsin. 408 U.S. 229, 229 (1972);
Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200, 201 (1971); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 503 (1966); see also
A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413,
415 (1966) (regarding book publisher's intervention in civil proceedings brought by the state attorney
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prosecuted. In a few instances, authorities prosecuted people for possession of
obscene material in a private home. 7" Despite prosecution of the sale, distribution,
publication, or possession of obscene material, police did not pursue the authors of
lurid novels or the producers of prurient films.
A political economy perspective recognizes the social power of local law
enforcement in relation to the accused. Political economy is concerned with the
power relations among actors. It "examines how media and communication systems
and content reinforce, challenge, or influence existing class and social relations. It
does this with a particular interest in how economic factors influence politics and
social relations."'" In the vast majority of the criminal law obscenity cases
examined for this article, the government was not pursuing large multinational
corporations, but rather small businesses that likely had limited resources with
which to fight a criminal prosecution. The Court was aware that police action
against small businesses could be quite effective in silencing obscene discourse. In
Dyson v. Stein, police raided the offices of a bi-weekly newspaper.72 In his dissent,
Justice Douglas described the raids as "search-and-destroy missions"" that resulted
in the newspaper being "effectively put out of business.""7 Additionally, Fort
Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana15involved the seizure of"literally thousands of books
and films."6 The Court stated, "It is incontestable that these proceedings were
begun to put an end to the sale of obscenity at the three bookstores named in the
complaint."7
Law enforcement officials' frequent seizure of the disputed material as if it
were contraband further supports the notion that obscene messages were
commodified. 78 In one case, "literally thousands of books and films were carried
away and taken out of circulation.""7 Yet the court has held on several occasions
that obscene publications are not contraband"0 : "The seizure of instruments of a
crime, such as a pistol or a knife, or 'contraband or stolen goods or objects
dangerous in themselves,' are to be distinguished from quantities of books and
movie films when a court appraises the reasonableness of the seizure ... 8 In

general against an allegedly obscene book).
70. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103. 107 (1990); Stanley v. Georgia. 394 U.S. 557. 558 (1969);
Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643, 644-45 (1961).
71. McChesney, supra note 3, at 43.
72. Dyson, 401 U.S. at 204 06 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 204.
74. Id. at 205.
75. 489 U.S. 46 (1989).
76. Id.at 67.
77. Id. at 65.
78. See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York. 442 U.S. 319,321-24 (1979): Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S.
216, 218 n.2 (1971); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 558 (1969).
79. Fort Wayne Books, Inc., 489 U.S. at 67.
80. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496. 505 (1973); A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas,
378 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1964): Marcus v. Search Warrant of Prop. at 104 E. Tenth St., 367 U.S. 717,
730 31 (1961).
81. Roaden, 413 U.S. at 502 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 472 (1971))
(citation omitted).
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another incident, state authorities seized 1,715 copies of allegedly obscene
paperbacks from a distributor with the intent to burn them.82 The Court stated, "It
is no answer to say that obscene books are contraband, and that consequently the
standards governing searches and seizures of allegedly obscene books should not
differ from those applied with respect to narcotics, gambling paraphernalia and
other contraband.'
In several cases, law enforcement officials arrested whatever employees
happened to be on duty at these small businesses, which further supports the notion
that the government focuses on the less powerful actors. The arrestees included
bookstore clerks and proprietors,84 a theater cashier,85 a film projectionist and
"ticket taker,"86 as well as theater managers or owners. Court opinions indicate
that some of the criminal defendants faced fines and jail time. 88 InMishkin v. New
York,89 the claimant, convicted of publishing obscene books, was sentenced to three
years in prison and $12,000 in fines.9"
In the cases examined for this Article, only in rare circumstances was the
originator of the message targeted for prosecution; however, these cases did not
involve the mass media.9 1 In these cases, the message was not commodified, but
rather cast as something other than expression. In Oakes, a photographer was
charged under a state criminal statute that attempted to curtail child exploitation by
forbidding anyone to pose a child in a "state of nudity" for reproduction in visual
material such as a photograph.92 In Cohen, a man with an expletive on his jacket
was arrested for disturbing the peace through offensive conduct.93 The nude dancers
in Barnes ran afoul of the state's public indecency statutes, which were intended to

82. A Quantity of Copies of Books, 378 U.S. at 208.
83. Id. at211-12.
84. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 499 (1987); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 465 (1985);
McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 672 73 (1976); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 116 (1973);
Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 322 (1970); Redrup v. New York. 386 U.S. 767, 768
(1967).
85. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 225 (1978).
86. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 485 (1973).
87. Ballew, 435 U.S. at 224-25: Jenkins v. Georgia. 418 U.S. 153, 155 (1974): Roaden v.
Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496. 497 (1973): Heller, 413 U.S. at 485; Rabe v. Washington. 405 U.S. 313. 313
(1972); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216, 217 (1971); Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636,
636 (1968); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 185 86 (1964).
88. See, e.g. Ward v.Illinois. 431 U.S. 767, 770 (1977) (vendor sentenced to one day in jail and
fined $200): Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 156 (theater manager sentenced to one year of probation and fined
$750); Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 229 (1972) (newspaper publisher sentenced to two years of
incarceration and fined $2,000); Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 186 (theater manager fined $2,500 and
sentenced to a workhouse if fines were not paid).
89. 383 U.S. 502 (1966)
90. Id.at 503 04.
91. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560,562-63 (1991) (involving nude dancers);
Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 580 (1989) (involving a man who took partially nude
photographs of a fourteen-year-old child): Cohen v. California. 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971) (involving a man
who wore a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" in a courthouse).
92. Oakes, 491 U.S. at 578 80 (citation omitted).
93. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16-17 (citations omitted).
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protect societal order.94 The Court noted that the dancer wanted to perform nude not
to express herself, but because she thought she would make more money that way.95
State criminal statutes have been used to shut down retail outlets that sell
obscenity through seizure of their inventory and arrest of their staff. This tactic
takes advantage of the commercial nature of the media in the United States. The
possibility of raid and arrest makes the sale of obscenity through brick-and-mortar
shops a risky business. Thus, the proliferation of obscenity on the Internet should
come as no surprise."
2.

Civil Statutes

Another way states sought to control purveyors of obscene content was through
civil nuisance statutes." As with the criminal statutes, these laws were aimed at
"'the commercial manufacturing, commercial distribution, or commercial
exhibition of obscene material."' 98 In Vance v. UniversalAmusementCo., the Court
viewed the situation at issue the imminent closure of an adults-only motion
picture theater under a public nuisance statute as regulation of commercial
activity.99 However, a regulation affecting freedom of expression required special
consideration: "[T]he regulation of a communicative activity such as the exhibition
of motion pictures must adhere to more narrowly drawn procedures than is
1°
necessary for the abatement of an ordinary nuisance.""
The facts of the nuisance statute cases indicate that these civil enforcement
actions threatened the viability of the targeted businesses. In one instance, officials
sought "confiscation and destruction of all merchandise" at a bookstore that was
alleged to carry some obscene material."' In another case, state law permitted a
one-year closure of any place deemed a nuisance, and the law defined
establishments that exhibited obscene films as nuisances. 10 2 In yet another case,
officials sought to enjoin the continued operation of an adult theater for violation
of local obscenity laws.1 3 Sometimes, business people fought back. In Brockett v.
Spokane Arcades, Inc.,' °4 plaintiff sellers of adult books and movies challenged the

94. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 562-63. 569.
95. Id. at 563
96. See, e.g., Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 736 (1998)
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000)) (restricting minors' access to harmful material on the
Internet).
97. See, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 493 94 (1985); California ex rel.
Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.' Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 90 91 (1981); Vance v. Universal
Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 309-10 (1980); MTM, Inc. v. Baxley. 420 U.S. 799. 799 (1975);
Huffinan v. Pursue, Ltd.. 420 U.S. 592,595-96 (1975): Speight v. Slaton. 415 U.S. 333, 333-34 (1974).
98. Vance, 445 U.S. at 310 (citation omitted).
99. Id. at 315 n. 12 (quoting Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56 (1965)).
100. Id. at 315.
101. Speight, 415 U.S. at 333.
102. Huffman, 420 U.S. at 595 96 (citations omitted).
103. MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 799, 799 (1975) (citations omitted).
104. 472 U.S. 491 (1985).
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constitutionality of a state moral nuisance statute that provided penalties for those
who deal in obscenity. 05 However, the Court held that the state moral nuisance
statute in question should not be completely invalidated.' °6
3.

Other State Controls

States occasionally use other regulatory powers in their efforts to control adultoriented businesses. At issue in a 1972 case were California's State Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control regulations prohibiting certain sexually oriented live
entertainment, such as topless and bottomless dancing, in licensed bars and
nightclubs. 10 7 The Court held that the "broad sweep ofthe Twenty-first Amendment
has been recognized as conferring something more than the normal state authority
over public health, welfare and morals."10 8 It upheld the constitutionality of the
regulations, making clear the regulations did not outlawthe performances; it simply
prohibited them in businesses licensed to serve liquor by the drink.0 9
The state of New York used civil public health law to crack down on an adult
bookstore at which undercover officers observed illicit sexual activity, as well as
solicitation of prostitution. 10 Following the undercover investigation, the state
sought to shut down the establishment."' The Court rejected the respondents'
argument that such closure posed an impermissible burden on their protected
12
bookselling activities,
noting that they were "free to sell the same materials at
13
another location."'
In one instance, a state university unsuccessfully tried to use its student conduct
code, which required adherence to a standard of decency, to expel a student over
publication of an allegedly obscene political cartoon in a campus newspaper.' 14
B. Municipal Controls
Adult bookstores and theaters, as well as nude dancing establishments, are
businesses that operate from a brick-and-mortar point of sale. Municipalities have
exercised considerable control over the expression of obscenity in these venues
through traditional powers such as zoning ordinances and business licensure." 5

105. Id.at 494.
106. Id. at 507.
107. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 110-11 (1972).
108. Id. at 114.
109. Id. at 118.
110. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.. 478 U.S. 697, 698-700 (1986).
111. Id. at 699.
112. Id.at 705 06.
113. Id.at 705.
114. Papish v. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 667 (1973).
115. See, e.g.. City ofLittleton v. Z. J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774. 776-77 (2004) (zoning
and licensure of adult businesses); City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 430
(2002) (zoning of adult businesses); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 43 (1986)
(zoning of adult movie theaters): Young v. American Mini Theatres. Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52, 62 (1976)
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They are able to do so because mass media are businesses that seek to sell their
wares-commodified forms of obscene expression.
Municipal ordinances represent state action." 6 The Court upheld the validity
of zoning ordinances and licensure of adult-oriented businesses as recently as 2004
when it decided City ofLittleton v. ZJ.Gifts D-4.' 17 In that case, the Court affirmed
the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance that restricted adult businesses to
specific areas of town and required them to get special adult business licenses." 8
According to the Court, the ordinance did not try to censor material; rather, it
applied "reasonably objective, nondiscretionary criteria unrelated to the content of
the expressive materials that an adult business may sell or display."' 19 The
20
ordinance was not likely to drive all adult material out of town, the Court said.
Framing the issue in terms of a business transaction, it stated that "the community
will likely contain outlets that sell protected adult material. A supplier of that
material 1should be able to find outlets; a potential buyer should be able to find a
12
seller.'
Zoning ordinances aimed at controlling the location of so-called adult
businesses have beenjustified based on the "secondary effects" ofthese businesses
on their vicinities. 2 2 These secondary effects were summarized well in Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc.,123 which considered the constitutionality ofDetroit's
"Anti-Skid Row Ordinance." 24 Urban planners and real estate experts inAmerican
Mini Theatres believed that a concentration of adult businesses "tends to attract an
undesirable quantity and quality of transients, adversely affects property values,
causes an increase in crime, especially prostitution, and encourages residents and
businesses to move elsewhere.' 125 Similarly, city planners in City of Los Angeles
v. Alameda Books, Inc.' 26 determined that groups of adult businesses were
associated with increased crime. 27 The Court accepted those arguments. 12 In his
concurrence in Alameda Books, Inc., Justice Kennedy likened adult businesses to
factories and slaughterhouses land uses that have "undesirable externalities" that
29
a municipality can control through the "traditional exercise of its zoning power."'1

(zoning and licensure of adult movie theaters).
116. Lovell v. City of Griffin. 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) (citations omitted).
117. 541 U.S. at 776.
118. Id. at 776 77.
119. Id. at 783.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 50 (1986).
123. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
124. Id. at 52-54.
125. Id. at 55.
126. 535 U.S. 425 (2002).
127. Id. at 430.
128. See, e.g., id. at 442; Renton v.Playtime Theatres. Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51 (1986).
129. Id. at 445-46 (Kennedy. J.. concurring). In one instance, the Court indicated that a drive-in
theater's status as a for-profit entity would give the owner an incentive to minimize the visibility of any
onscreen nudity from the street. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 11 n.6 (1975)
"Appellant manages a commercial enterprise which depends for its success on paying customers, not
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Several mid-1900s cases dealt with municipal and state motion picture
licensing laws. 130 Commercial interests were in the forefront of these cases. The
petitioners were exhibitors and distributors of allegedly obscene films and had been
enjoined from showing them in particular locations. The licensing laws at issue
spoke to the commercial nature of the activity. In what was perhaps the earliest
such case, Kingsley InternationalPicturesCorp. v. Regents of the University of the
State of New York, the Court deemed unconstitutional a state law that made it
unlawful "'to exhibit, or to sell, lease or lend for exhibition at any place of
amusement for pay or in connection with any business' any film that was obscene
or contained other objectionable content as proscribed by law.'31 In addition, the
Court said the vagueness of one municipal ordinance could have a powerful impact
on the quality of future motion pictures, due to the films' commercial nature:
"[O]ne who wishes to convey his ideas through [film], which of course includes one
who is interested not so much in expression as in making money, must consider
whether what he proposes to film ... is within the terms of classification schemes
such as this.' 13 ' The Court indicated that fear of financial risk or failure could result
in exhibitors showing "only the totally inane.' 33
Nude dancing was at issue in several cases, but the law of obscenity was not
always invoked. Rather, public indecency laws were applied, and the situations
were handled in several ways. Some nude dancing was construed as expressive
conduct.' 34 However, in other situations regulation of nude performance was treated
as a prior restraint 35 or analyzed as a time, place, and manner restriction. 3 6 The
state interests at issue in these cases were the protection of morality and social
order, 137 as well as prevention of the negative secondary effects of adult-oriented

on freeloading passersby. Presumably. where economically feasible, the screen of a drive-in theater will
be shielded from those who do not pay." Id.
130. In each of the following cases, the Court found the motion picture licensing law
impermissible: Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas,390 U.S. 676, 682 (1968); Teitel Filn Corp.
v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139. 141 (1968) (per curiam): Freedmanv. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 60 (1965);
Kingsley InternationalPictures Corp. v.Regents of the University of the State of New York, 360 U.S.
684, 688 90 (1959).
131. 360 U.S. at 684-685 (citation omitted).
132. interstate Circuit,Inc., 390 U.S. at 684.
133. Id.
134. City of Erie v. Pap's A. M., 529 U.S. 277,285 (2000); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S.
560, 565-66 (1991). These government restrictions on public nudity were examined under the four-part
test of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Pap'sA. M, 529 U.S. at 289 (O'Connor, J.,
plurality opinion); Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566 67. The test sets forth the following requirements:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and ifthe incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
135. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 550. 552 (1975).
136. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75 (1981).
137. See, e.g., Barnes, 501 U.S. at 568 (stating that the purpose behind the state's public nudity
statute was apparent from the statute's text and legislative history).
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businesses. 131
Each of these nude dancing cases dealt with commercial establishments
offering this type of entertainment.' The commercial nature of the expression was
noted in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 140 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated that one of the respondents, a nude dancer, wanted to "dance nude
because she would make more money doing so."' 41 Similarly, in Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,a lower court contended that the petitioner, who had
been denied use of a municipal theater for a production of the musical Hair,had not
shown irreparable harm because the issue was "'purely a matter of financial loss or
gain' and was compensable."'4 2 In Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, the
respondent framed the matter as one of commercial district zoning.'43 The borough
contended that exclusion of commercial live entertainment was based on a desire
to avoid the problems it might bring, such as trash, a lack of parking, and a need for
police protection.' 44 However, the Court indicated that the borough presented no
evidence that live entertainment
posed worse problems than other permitted uses
14
in the commercial zone. 1
In sum, when exerting control over obscenity through zoning or licensure,
municipalities emphasized protection of property values. They said adult businesses
brought crime, trash, and transients. The nature of the expression offered for sale
by these businesses, and whether it deserved constitutional protection, did not
figure into the Court's decisions.
C. FederalControls
The federal government uses several of its powers, including regulation of the
postal service and the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, to control obscenity
by commodifying it.
1. Postal Service
The federal government has sought to limit obscenity by exercising its control

138. See, e.g.. Pap's A. M.. 529 U.S. at 291 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (stating that the
ordinance was not aimed at regulating people who watch nude dancing, "but rather the secondary
effects, such as impacts on public health. safety. and welfare").
139. Id. at 284 (concerning Kandyland, an establishment featuring totally nude erotic dancing
performed by women); Barnes, 501 U.S. at 563 (concerning the Kitty Kat Lounge, which featured gogo dancing by dancers who wore pasties and G-strings); Schad, 452 U.S. at 62 (regarding an adult
bookstore that provided the opportunity to watch a live dancer, usually nude, perform behind a glass
panel): Conrad,420 U.S. at 547 (regarding performance of the musical Hair in a municipal theater).
Barnes involved a state statute, but the other cases involved municipal regulations.
140. 501 U.S. at 563.
141. Id.
142. 420 U.S. at 549-50.
143. 452 U.S. at 63.
144. Id. at 73.
145. Id.
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over the mails. Federal statutes declare obscene publications to be nonmailable
matter-matter that "shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post
office or by any letter carrier."' 46 This approach relies on the commodification of
obscene material; the emphasis is on restricting dissemination of the tangible
expression of an idea, rather than on suppressing the idea itself. Cases relying on
the federal mail statutes involve both
print and video materials-tangible items that
47
need to be physically transported.
Use of the postal service is considered an essential part of First Amendment
freedoms. The Court has stated, "The United States may give up the Post Office
when it sees fit, but while it carries it on the use of the mails is almost as much a
part of free speech as the right to use our tongues .... ""' But the postal service
cases generally construed the exchange of obscene material as a commercial
transaction rather than as an exchange of ideas. In United States v. Reidel,'49 the
Court rejected a lower court's argument that if Stanley v. Georgiaconferred a right
to possess obscene material in the home, 5 ° then "someone must have the right to
deliver it to him."'' The Court scoffed at this idea: the respondent's argument was
based "squarely on a claimed First Amendment right to do business in obscenity
and use the mails in the process,"'5 2 but "obscenity and its distribution [are] outside
the reach of the First Amendment."
The Court, in Ginzburg v. United States, ' said "commercial activity, in itself,
is no justification for narrowing the protection of expression secured by the First
Amendment,"'5 4 but said that the case involved "sales of illicit merchandise, not
sales of constitutionally protected matter."' 55 Yet the commercial nature of an

146. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (2000); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2000 & Supp. 2003) (prohibiting the
mailing of sexually explicit material involving minors) 39 U.S.C. § 3006 (repealed 1999) (prohibiting
acceptance of payment for obscene material through the mail).
147. See, e.g., Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540,542 (1992) (magazines); Pinkus v. United
States, 436 U.S. 293, 295-96 (1978) (books. magazines. and films); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S.
291, 293 (1977) (magazines and film); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87. 91 (1974) (book and
advertising brochure for book); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971) (magazines); Rowan v. United
States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (concerning mail order services' challenge to statute that
allows addressees to opt out of mailed advertisements they believe to be "sexually provocative")
United States v. Reidel. 402 U.S. 351 (1971) (illustrated booklet); Redmond v. United States. 384 U.S.
264 (1966) (undeveloped film); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966) (book, magazine, and
newsletter); Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962) (magazines); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957) (advertising circulars).- Hannegan v. Esquire. Inc.. 327 U.S. 146 (1946) (non-obscene
magazine): Dunlop v. United States. 165 U.S. 486 (1897) (newspaper) Price v. United States, 165 U.S.
311 (1897) (book); Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29 (1896) (twelve-page paper)..
148. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965) (quoting United States ex rel.
Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ'g. Co. v. Burleson. 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921) (Holmes, J..
dissenting)).
149. 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
150. 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969).
151. Reidel, 402 U.S. at 355.
152. Id. at 356.
153. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
154. Id. at 474.
155. Id. at 475.
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exchange of obscene material continued to figure in the Court's decisions. Despite
the Court's disclaimer, it said Ginzberg was decided "against a background of
commercial exploitation of erotica solely for the sake of [the publications'] prurient
appeal.' ' 156 In another case, the Court noted that the federal mail statutes were
intended to "deny use of the mails to commercial distributors of obscene
literature.
Some of the mailings at issue were advertisements in addition to films or
printed material; 158 federal law prohibits the mailing of obscene ads as well as
products.19 The commercial speech doctrine only began to develop during the last
twenty-five years of the twentieth century, so many of these cases were decided
long before the Court established any protections for this type of speech. 60
Corporations and business people were well represented among the respondents in
the mail-related cases. 6' As noted in one case, the respondents were concerned
62
about the mail statute because their "business activities [were] affected."'
The Court was more lenient in the cases involving individuals' mailing of
obscenity cases in which the respondent was not making a profit. In one case, the
government prosecuted the recipient of obscene material under the Child Protection
Act of 1984163 because the material depicted minors engaged in sexually explicit
conduct in violation of that law.'64 The conviction was overturned based on the
government entrapping the defendant. 165 In another case, the Court vacated the
conviction
of a couple who "mailed undeveloped films of each other posing in the
,, 166
nude.

The federal mail cases do not arise from complaints of unwilling recipients of
obscene mailings. One might infer that they are initiated by zealous officials in the
tradition of Anthony Comstock rather than by officials responding to a public

156. Id. at 466.
157. Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410. 416 (1971).
158. See Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 295 96 (1978); Hamling v. United States, 418
U.S. 87, 91 (1974); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 731 (1970); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476. 480 (1957): Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486. 489-90 (1897).
159. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (2000).
160. The Court established that commercial speech was entitled to some protection in Bigelow
v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975).
161. See, e.g.. Hamling,418 U.S. at 91 (corporations); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351,353
(1971) (businessman) Blount, 400 U.S. at 410 (retail magazine distributor); Rowan, 397 U.S. at 728
(publishers, distributors, owners, and operators of mail-order houses, mailing list brokers, and owners
and operators of mail service organizations); Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 464 (corporations); Manual Enters.,
Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478. 480 (1962) (magazine publishing corporations); Roth, 354 U.S. at 480
(businessmen): Halnnegan v. Esquire. 327 U.S. 146. 149 (1946) (publisher): Dunlop. 165 U.S. at 488
(newspaper publisher).
162. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 729.
163. Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (2000 &
Supp. 2004)).
164. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 542 (1992).
165. Id. at 554.
166. Redmond v. United States, 384 U.S. 264. 264 (1966).
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demand for action. 167
2.

Commerce Clause

The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to
regulate interstate commerce. 68 This indisputably legitimate federal power has been
used to control the distribution of obscenity. The government is able to exercise
such power because the primary purveyors of obscenity, the mass media, are
businesses, and the government treats their messages as commodities to be sold in
the market. By shifting the perspective in these Commerce Clause cases to one of
property rather than expression, the government calls into play a set of laws that
places fewer limits on its authority. Use of the Commerce Clause to control
obscenity is an archetypal example of the commodification of obscene content.
At issue in these cases was the transportation of tangible obscene materials
across state lines, 169 which is criminalized by federal statute. 170 In UnitedStates v.
Orito, the Court spoke strongly in favor of government's ability to control this
transportation. 171Orito was accused of sending eighty-three reels of film by air from
San Francisco to Milwaukee. 172 It did not matter, the Court said, that a private
common carrier transported the obscene materials. 173 Rather, the court stated, "the
Government has a legitimate interest in protecting the public commercial74
environment by preventing such material from entering the stream of commerce."1
The fact that Stanley v. Georgia established the right to possess obscenity in the
home 175 did not create a correlative right to receive, transport, or distribute such
76
material.1
United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs'77 and United States v. 12 200-Ft.
Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 78 cases involving the importation of obscene material,
also emphasized the commercial nature of obscenity. The very names of the cases
speak to the commodification of the expressive material involved. Thirty-Seven
Photographs concerned the importation of photos to be used in a book for

167. See supra notes 29 32 and accompanying text.
168. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
169. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64. 66 (1994) (videotapes); Alexander v.
United States, 509 U.S. 544,546, 547 (1993) (magazines and videotapes); Walter v. United States, 447
U.S. 649, 651 (1980) (film); Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 189 (1977) (medium unclear);
United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139. 140 (1973) (film): United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super
8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973) (slides, photographs. and films); United States v. Thirty-Seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 365 (1971) (photographs); United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680, 681
(1950) (phonograph records).
170. 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (2000).
171. 413 U.S. at 143.
172. Id. at 140.
173. Id. at 143.
174. Id.
175. Stanley v. Georgia. 394 U.S. 557. 559 (1969).
176. Orito, 413 U.S. at 141.
177. 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
178. 413 U.S. 123 (1973).
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commercial distribution,1"9 which was prohibited by section 305 of the Tariff Act
of 1930.180 The Court upheld the power of customs officers to exclude illegal
articles from the country, including obscene materials. 8' "Congress may declare it
contraband and prohibit its importation,'' 82 the Court stated, in apparent
contradiction of its holdings regarding obscenity as contraband in the state criminal
law cases. 813In12 200-Ft.Reels of Super 8mm. Film, the respondent contended that
the materials at issue were for his private use only, but the Court rejected that
argument"': "To allow such a claim would be not unlike compelling the
Government to permit importation of prohibited or controlled drugs for private
consumption as long as such drugs are not for public distribution or sale"' 15 Here
again, the Court likened obscene materials to contraband, essentially commodifying
this form of expression.
Transportation of obscene material in interstate commerce was the basis for
charges under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)' 86
in Alexander v. United States.'87 Petitioner Alexander had been in the adult
entertainment business for thirty years and had thirteen retail stores throughout
Minnesota from which he sold magazines and videos that the jury deemed
obscene.' 88 The jury found him guilty of RICO violations, and he was sentenced to
six years in prison. 8 9 In addition, the Court ordered Alexander to forfeit his
wholesale and retail businesses, as well as nearly $9 million acquired through
racketeering activity."'
Alexander provides a particularly clear example of the commodification of
obscenity. RICO was intended to attack the "economic roots of organized crime.''.
It prohibits dealing in obscene matter, among other activities, and requires
"mandatory forfeiture of assets because of the financial role they play in the
operation of the racketeering enterprise. ' Thus, the law aims to stop the
dissemination of obscenity through the control of businesses that deal in obscene
materials. The statute makes no exception for assets with expressive value.
"[B]ooks, sports cars, narcotics, and cash are all forfeitable alike ....[A] contrary
scheme would be disastrous from a policy standpoint, enabling racketeers to evade

179. 402 U.S. at 366.
180. Pub. L. No. 361, 46 Stat. 688 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (2000 & Supp.
2004)).
181. Thirty-Seven Photographs,402 U.S. at 376-77.
182. Id.
183. See supra notes 78 83 and accompanying text.
184. 413 U.S. at 128.
185. Id.
186. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922. 941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961 1968 (2000)).
187. 509 U.S. 544, 547 (1993).
188. Id.
189. Id.at 547-48.
190. Id.at 548.
191. Id.at 562 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
192. Id.at 551.
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forfeiture by investing the proceeds of their crimes in businesses engaging in
'
expressive activity. 193
The court rejected Alexander's argument that the forfeiture,
which put him out of business, was an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.' 94
Writing in a separate opinion, Justice Souter stated that the First Amendment
forbids the forfeiture of Alexander's expressive material in the absence of an
adjudication that the material was in fact obscene.' Justice Kennedy added:
What is at work in this case is not the power to punish an
individual for his past transgressions but the authority to suppress
a particular class of disfavored speech. The forfeiture provisions
accomplish this ...in an indirect way by threatening all who
engage in the business of distributing adult or sexually explicit
materials with the same disabling measures.' 96
The specter of financial ruin, then, was used to discourage businesses from trading
in this category of expression. The commercial nature of the obscenity industry
clearly left it vulnerable to government control.
3.

Telecommunications Regulation

The government has regulated broadcasters practically from their inception,
and common carriers nearly as long. It has viewed the electromagnetic spectrum as
a scarce natural resource and initially sought to regulate radio to prevent
technological cacophony. 9 But the government's control has crept beyond that.
The Radio Act of 1927, in its original version, stated that, although the government
was not empowered to censor broadcast content, obscenity was nonetheless
prohibited on the airwaves.' 98 Regulation of common carriers appeared in the
Communications Act of 1934.'9'
The older electronic media in the United States have been described as
"predominantly privately owned and commercially viable though regulated, and
characterized by particular corporations confined to providing particular
communication services. '211 Corporations, rather than mom-and-pop operations,
were involved in the electronic media cases. Of course, because government wields
much power over the electronic media, few disputes over obscene content have

193. Id. at 551-52.
194. Id.at 552 54.
195. Id. at 560 (Souter. J., concurring in judgment, dissenting in part).
196. Id. at 574 (Kennedy. J.. dissenting).
197. See, e.g.,
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 399 (1969) (noting the scarcity of the
resource).
198. Pub. L. No. 632, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed 1934). 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2000) currently forbids
censorship of broadcast material, however there is no clause prohibiting obscenity over the radio waves.
199. Pub. L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 1091 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2000)).
200. Robert B. Horwitz, U.S. Media Policy Then and Now, in CONVERGING MEDIA, DIVERGING
POLITICS, supra note 36, at 25, 29.
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made their way to the Supreme Court. We see a case dealing with sexually explicit
content each time a new electronic medium of communication developed.
Perhaps the most well known of the regulatory cases dealing with sexually
explicit material is FCC v. PacificaFoundation,decided in 1978.201 It was in this
case that the Court confirmed the government's right to control indecent as well as
obscene broadcast content. 2°2 Following this case, the Court found ways to
accommodate sexually explicit material on the electronic media.
The transmission of sex-related material on cable television was at issue in
2 3
DenverAreaEducationalTelecommunicationsConsortium,Inc. v. FCC.
1 Federal
law restricts indecent content on cable in several ways. First, if a cable operator
permits the broadcast of sexually-related material, it must segregate and block the
indecent programming.2 4 Second, it permits cable operators to prohibit public
access channels from airing programming dealing with obscenity, sexual content,
or the promotion of unlawful conduct.2"5 Both provisions were declared
unconstitutional. 2 6 The claimants in this case were several major organizations,
rather than sole proprietorships, and the Court accommodated them to a certain
extent.
In Sable Communicationsof California,Inc. v. FCC,20 7 the Court considered
the regulation of content transmitted by common carriers. 208 The Communications
Act of 1934, as amended in 1988, prohibited both indecent and obscene interstate
commercial telephone communications. 2 9 The Court also emphasized the
commercial nature of the messages at issue: "Dial-a-porn is big business. The diala-porn service in New York City alone received six to seven million calls a month
for the 6-month period ending in April 1985.,,21° The Court upheld the
government's power to ban obscene commercial telephone communications, but
not indecent communications.211 Here again, the petitioner was a big business-an
affiliate of Los Angeles-based Carlin Communications, Inc.-and the Court
allowed it to stay in business.212
Sexually oriented programming transmitted on cable television was at issue in
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.21 3 Playboy Entertainment
Group, a subsidiary of Playboy Enterprises, Inc., "owns and prepares programs for

201. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
202. Id. at 745, 748-49.
203. 518 U.S. 727, 732 (1996).
204. Id. at 735.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 733.
207. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
208. Id. at 117.
209. Pub. L. No. 100-690, sec. 7524, 102 Stat. 4181, 4502 (1988) (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. § 223(b) (2000)).
210. See Sable Commc 'ns, 492 U.S. at 120 n.3 (citing Carlin Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC. 787 F.2d
846, 848 (2d Cir. 1986)).
211. Id. at 131.
212. Id. at 117.
213. 529 U.S. 803, 807 (2000).
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adult television networks. 2 14 Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996215 required cable operators to scramble or block transmission of the audio and
video signals so that nonsubscribers would not be exposed to the programming.
Alternatively, the programming distributor could "limit the access of children to the
programming.., by not providing such programming during the hours of the day
(as determined by the Commission) when a significant number of children are
likely to view it.", 216 Cable television operators provided the content to customers
who paid either a monthly subscription fee or on a pay-per-view basis.217 Because
scrambling technology was imperfect, many cable operators restricted adult content
to the overnight safe harbor period.2" 8 This meant subscribers could not receive such
content for two-thirds of the day.219 Playboy complained this was too restrictive,
and the Court agreed that the government failed to devise the least restrictive means
of protecting unsuspecting children from signal bleed, keeping the enterprise in
business.220
Most recently, under its power to regulate telecommunications, Congress has
sought to criminalize indecent communication on the Internet. It initially passed the
Communications Decency Act (CDA) as part of the Telecommunications Act of
1996.221 The relevant legislation prohibited the computer transmission of obscene
or indecent communications to minors.222 The Court was highly critical of the act,
stating, "The breadth of the CDA's coverage is wholly unprecedented.... [T]he
scope of the CDA is not limited to commercial speech or commercial entities. 223
The Court ultimately deemed the CDA violative of the First Amendment.224
The notion from political economy of communication being embedded in a
macrostructure of power is relevant here. In Reno v. ACLU, the Court noted that
transmission of obscenity and child pornography was already prohibited by existing
criminal laws.225 In fact, according to the Court, during Congressional consideration
of the CDA, a representative of the Department of Justice "expressed its view that
the law was unnecessary because existing laws already authorized its ongoing
efforts to prosecute obscenity, child pornography and child solicitation. ' , 226 It is
plausible that Congress continued to pursue such legislation more for publicity and

214. Id. Playboy Enterprises. Inc. is publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange. See
Playboy Enterprises, Inc., Investor Relations, http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c
=100055&p=irol-IRHome (last visited June 7, 2007).
215. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 136 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 561(a) (1994)).
216. Id. § 561(b).
217. Playboy Entm 't Group, Inc.,
529 U.S. at 807.
218. Id.at 806.
219. Id. at 812.
220. Id. at 827.
221. Telecommunications Act of 1996, tit. 5, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000 & Supp. ITT2003)).
222. 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (2000).
223. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844. 877 (1997).
224. Id.at 874.
225. Id.at 877 n.44.
226. Id. (citing 141 Cong. Rec. S8434 (daily ed. June 14, 1995)).
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self-promotion than for practical reasons.
Following the Court's rejection of the CDA, Congress passed section 1403(a)
of the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), which was more narrowly focused,
prohibiting the knowing posting, for commercialpurposes, of content harmful to
minors on the Internet.22 Nonetheless, the Court ultimately let stand a preliminary
injunction against the law's enforcement on the ground that the government had not
shown that the law used the least restrictive means in accomplishing its goals.228
Court discussion of online child pornography framed it as a vice industry rather
than as a form of expression. In its attempt to ban pornography involving "virtual,"
as well as real children, the government said its objective was to eliminate the
market for pornography depicting real children.229 The government argued that
virtual child pornography increased demand for images using real children.230 The
Court disagreed, stating that if virtual child pornography were equivalent to real
child pornography, real images would disappear from the market as pornographers
sought to avoid the risk of prosecution.23'
4. Spending Power
The federal government is empowered to attach conditions to and exercise
discretion in its funding allocations. It has exercised this power in efforts to control
obscenity; the Court has upheld its use in at least two instances. In the first
example, the Court held that Congress can condition federal assistance to public
libraries on the libraries' installation of software that blocks obscenity.2 32 In
addition, the National Endowment for the Arts can deny funding for obscenity
without artistic merit.233
Government at several levels has employed an array of legal controls over
obscenity. It has avoided First Amendment issues by treating obscenity as a
tangible product rather than protected expression. Government is able to control the
sales and distribution of this product through its legitimate power over commercial
activity, the postal service, and other affairs. This discussion has also shown that
government has targeted small, vulnerable businesses that are said to attract
unwelcome transients. The desirability of transients touches on the matter of social
class differences. The role of social class in the control of obscenity is explored in
more depth in Part VI.

227. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-736 (1998) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 23 l(a)
(2000)).
228. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656. 673 (2004); see also Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 585
(2002) (holding that CAPA was not facially overbroad for using community standards to determine
what material should be banned from the Internet).
229. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 254 (2002).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 199 (2003).
233. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 576 (1998) (quoting 20 U.S.C.
§ 954(d)).
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V1. SOCIAL CLASS DIFFERENCES

In addition to commodification, the process of structuration is important to
political economy. Structuration is a "process by which structures are constituted
out of human agency, even as they provide the very 'medium' of that
constitution." 24 Structuration allows us to further examine the notion of power and
to understand social relations. Political economy has emphasized class structuration
as a means of understanding social life, such as the process of elite rule.235
Social class structuration has played a role in the Supreme Court's obscenity
decisions. While this is not surprising, it is nonetheless worth examining in greater
depth as part of a political economy analysis. The obscene material at issue in these
cases usually could be described as popular, rather than elite culture. Elite or "high"
culture has been described as having two key characteristics: "(1) it is created by,
or under the supervision of, a cultural elite operating with some aesthetic, literary,
or scientific tradition ... [and] (2) critical standards independent of the consumer
of [the] product are systematically applied to it. ' ' 2 16 Mass
or popular culture refers
2 37

to "products manufactured solely for the mass market.
The Court's definition of obscenity essentially singles out high culture for
protection. The three-part test put forth in Miller v. California238 considers the
following: (1) "whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, would say that the work, taken as a whole, appealed to the prurient
interest"; (2) "whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law"; and (3) "whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value."2 39 The third prong arguably protects works of high culture but not
necessarily mass culture.
Dicta in California v. LaRue,24 ° decided in 1972, illustrate the Court's
protection of high culture. The case stemmed from a state Alcoholic Beverage
Control Department regulation prohibiting "topless" and "bottomless" dancers, and
the showing of films displaying sexual acts, in establishments that serve liquor by
the drink. 241 The Court rejected the respondents' claim that the regulations ran afoul
of the First Amendment.242 Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist distinguished
the cultural significance of the regulated performance and other artistic
presentations:
[W]e would poorly serve both the interests for which the State

234.
235.
236.
237.

Mosco. supra note 33. at 212 (emphasis omitted).
See id. at 217.
McQUAIL, supra note 2, at 43 (citation omitted).
Id. (emphasis omitted).

238. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id. at 24.
409 U.S. 109 (1972).
Id.at 111 12.
Id. at 118-19.
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may validly seek vindication and the interests protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments were we to insist that the sort
of bacchanalian revelries that the Department sought to prevent
by these liquor regulations were the constitutional equivalent of
a performance by a scantily clad ballet troupe in a theater.243
Justice Marshall dissented, but his dissent was based on the regulation's failure to
require proof of a lack of redeeming social value. 244 "The regulations thus treat on
the same level a serious movie such as 'Ulysses' and a crudely made 'stag film.'
They ban not only obviously pornographic photographs, but also great sculpture
from antiquity. '24 5 Marshall continued, quoting an article from the National
Observer: "Context is the essence of esthetic judgment. ... There is a world of
difference between Playboy and less pretentious girly magazines on the one hand,
and on the other, The Nude, a picture selection from the whole2 46history of art, by that
fine teacher and interpreter of civilization, Kenneth Clark.,
Indeed, most ofthe material at issue in the obscenity cases was, like the dancers
in LaRue, a far cry from a pas de deux in Swan Lake. A survey of some titles
suggests that most would not be considered high culture. These include films such
25
249
248
247
as It All Comes Out in the End, Blue Movie, Lust Campus, PassionBride, 1
Debbie Does Dallas,25 ' and Terrorized Virgin.252 Some of the businesses involved
in the cases were the "Pussycat Adult Theater, 25 3"Harem Bookstore,, 254 "Kitty Kat
25 8
25 7
2 6
Lounge,, 255 "Kandyland,", "Playtime Theaters," and "X-Citement Video., 259
Books at issue included The Housewife's Handbook on Selective Promiscuity,
The Sinning Season, Backstage Sinner, Sin Hotel, Sex Circus, and The WifeSwappers.2 ' The latter's back cover touted "[e]ight of the most lusty, passionate
26
women in town, each with her different desires, her peculiar sex habits. '

243.
244.
245.
246.

Id. at 118.
Id. at 127 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 127 28 n.6 (quoting Edmund Fuller, ChangingSociety Puts Taste to the Test, NAT'L
OBSERVER, June 10, 1972, at 24).
247. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 51 (1973).
248. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 485 (1973).
249. Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 770 n.3 (1977).
250. Id. at 772 n.3.
251. New York v. P. J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 870 n.2 (1986).
252. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 293 (1977).
253. MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 799, 800 (1975).
254. Speight v. Slaton, 415 U.S. 333, 333 (1974).
255. Barnes v. Glen Theatre. Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 563 (1991).
256. City of Erie v. Pap's A. M., 529 U.S. 277, 284 (2000).
257. City ofRenton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 43 (1986).
258. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.. 513 U.S. 64. 66 (1994).
259. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463. 466 (1966).
260. A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 215 n.I (1964) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
261. Id. at 216n.1.
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Additionally, the Court found the Child Pornography Protection Act violative
of the First Amendment 26 2 because it prohibited depictions of teenage sexual
activity even if the work had serious literary or artistic value. 263 The Court noted
that Shakespeare's enduringly popular Romeo andJuliet concerns this theme.264 In
considering postal regulations that allowed a second-class rate for works devoted
to the sciences or the arts, the Court said the rules still required the uncensored
distribution of literature, given the wide variety of tastes that exist concerning good
art.265 "There doubtless would be a contrariety of views concerning Cervantes' Don
'
Quixote, Shakespeare's Venus and Adonis, or Zola's Nana."266
Furthermore, in
assessing whether the book commonly known as Fanny Hill was obscene, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts heard testimony from five English
literature professors from the Boston area who characterized it as a "minor 'work
of art' having 'literary merit' and 'historical value.' 267 However, in a latter case the
Supreme Court pointed out, "A quotation from Voltaire in the flyleaf
of a book will
268
not constitutionally redeem an otherwise obscene publication.,
The Court has acknowledged that some works that today we consider serious
literature were at one point alleged to be obscene. For example, a film of D. H.
Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover was denied a license for exhibition in New
York.269 Justice Frankfurter noted in his concurrence that Lawrence "knew there
was such a thing as pornography, dirt for dirt's sake, or, to be more accurate, dirt
for money's sake.,, 27" He quoted Lawrence as saying that "genuine pornography is
almost always underworld, it doesn't come out in the open."' Other literary works
that have been challenged as obscene include Theodore Dreiser's An American
Tragedy272 and James Joyce's Ulysses.273
VII. CONCLUSION

The U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in obscenity cases, analyzed through the
lens of political economy, reveal that obscene content has been controlled largely
by restricting commerce in it rather than by attempts to quash the expression of
erotic ideas. By viewing obscenity as a commercial product, government has

262. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002).
263. Id.at 246.
264. Id. at 247.
265. Hannegan v. Esquire. Inc. 327 U.S. 146, 158 (1946).
266. Id.at 157 58.
267. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 383
U.S. 413. 415-16 n.2 (1966).
268. Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229. 231 (1972).
269. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 685,
692 (1959).
270. Id. at 692 (Frankfurter. J.. concurring).
271. Id. at 692 (quoting D. H. LAWRENCE, PORNOGRAPHY AND OBSCENITY 12-13 (1929)).
272. See Commonwealth v. Friede, 171 N.E. 472, 472 73 (Mass. 1930).
273. See United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705, 706 (2d Cir.
1934).
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commodified it, allowing it to perpetuate content-based restrictions over sexually
explicit material even as other content-based restrictions have fallen away. Because
our legal system gives government more control over commerce than over the
expression of ideas, this commodification has proved to be a very powerful means
of controlling speech. The American media system is overwhelmingly commercial
and therefore has lent itself to this form of control. Governments at the local, state,
and federal levels have used various legitimate powers over commerce to restrict
or eliminate trade in obscene content. This sets a dangerous precedent for freedom
of expression. Those concerned about First Amendment freedoms would do well
to carefully monitor the propertization of speech and the control of the business
processes of the mass media.
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